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Radicalization among youth remains a growing concern to Canadians with an 
increased fear of homegrown terrorism. According to a survey conducted by the Angus Reid 
Institute (2016), nearly two-thirds of Canadians (62%) believed that homegrown terrorism 
was a serious threat. This fear of further attacks by violent extremists required a response to 
the developing trend of radicalization. While Canada has experienced radicalization leading to 
violence in the past with the Front de liberation du Quebec (FLQ) in the 1960s and other 
extremist groups, modern radicalization has evolved to include extremists who conduct 
violent acts in the name of religion. As a result, de-radicalization of youth from violent 
extremism addresses the likelihood of further attacks in Canada and addresses the anxiety of 
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Abstract 
Youth radicalization leading to violence has become a growing fear among 
Canadians, as terrorist attacks are carried out in Western states. Although Canada 
has suffered relatively fewer acts of violence, this fear has intensified and a de-
radicalization strategy is needed in the Canadian context. In a qualitative case 
study methodology, interviews were conducted with school counsellors, religious 
leaders, and academics to explore solutions to youth radicalization. Youth de-
radicalization approaches from the United Kingdom were analyzed and found that 
community-based initiatives were missing from programming. Social identity 
theory is used to explain that youth join radicalized groups to feel a sense of 
belonging and have to be provided an alternative and moderate group identity to 
de-radicalize. This study found youth de-radicalization in Canada is best served 













domestic terrorism. An example of the modern radicalization is the so-called Islamic State of 
Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which has become a growing concern within the Middle East, and 
appeals to young Muslims to join their extremism in a claim for territory (Human Rights 
Watch, 2014). With their extensive manipulation of Islam through social media, ISIS has 
recruited young foreign fighters from around the globe and has implored extremists to attack 
Western targets (Bell, 2014). These issues lead to the central question of this research on what 
initiatives and practices can be incorporated into Canadian youth de-radicalization 
approaches. 
 Canada is currently “experiencing a growing radicalization problem, underscored by 
the October 2014 terror attacks that resulted in the deaths of two Canadian Forces members” 
(Bell, 2016). Despite the relatively low number of successful terrorist plots in Canada, many 
religious and government organizations have been rushed to create an effective de-
radicalization program for young Canadians (Nasser, 2015; Wade, 2015). Previous Canadian 
counter-measures appeared ineffectual and contained a lack of emphasis on the importance of 
social identity and community-based initiatives (Freeze & Stone, 2016). Examples of these 
missing components are illustrated in Stephen Harper’s Conservative government, who was 
criticized for having a punitive approach to de-radicalization, as their strategy involved 
treating perpetrators “as harshly as possible” (Cullen, 2014). However, in March 2016, the 
current Liberal government under Prime Minister Justin Trudeau highlighted the need for 
community-based approaches, by unveiling a plan that involved $35 million over five years 
“to fund programs that reach out to vulnerable people open to radicalization” (Wilton, 2016). 
However, despite numerous programs globally, there has been difficulty in creating a 
successful de-radicalization program. This frustration was noted from former Canadian 
Security Intelligence Services (CSIS) analyst, Paul Gurski who contended that de-
radicalization programs were implemented all over the world, yet “no one has really figured 
out the best approach” (Freeze & Stone, 2016). However, by analyzing existing policies and 
practices by other organizations and governments, an effective model can be derived and 












In deciphering why young Canadians consider joining brutal campaigns like ISIS, 
identity issues were cited as a common theme among radicalized youth (Bizina & Gray, 2014; 
Koehler, 2016; Williams & Lindsey, 2014; Altier, Throughgood, & Horgan, 2014). In the 
formative years of youth development, the concept of the self and identity could be 
threatened. In some cases of radicalization, “young men turn to extremism in their search for 
identity acceptance and purpose which they are unable to find in the community more often 
concerned with wealth accumulation rather than healthy relationship-building” (Bizina & 
Gray, 2014, p. 72). As a result of this issue, social identity theory was implemented in this 
study as a theoretical framework. Tajfel (1981), who originally formulated social identity 
theory, recognized that an individual’s identity is derived from group memberships and the 
emotional significance attached to that group (Tajfel, 1981, p. 225). In a search for a group 
identity, peers can begin to see their group as the norm and the correct narrative, leading to 
extremist views (Spears, 2011, p. 203). Social identity theory may explain why youth 
radicalize and can inform an effective paradigm for de-radicalizing young Canadians. 
To find a framework for de-radicalization in the Canadian context, the policies of 
United Kingdom (UK) will be analyzed, as well as primary data from Canadian religious 
leaders, school counsellors, and academics. Using Seawright and Gerring’s (2008) selection 
techniques in case study research, the UK and has been chosen for an extensive analysis 
because of its similarities to Canada in terms of the use of community-based initiatives, 
interaction with religious leaders, level of government involvement, and perception from the 
community. Exploring these factors will demonstrate that de-radicalization is not a simple 
program initiative, but involves multiple stakeholders at the local, provincial, and national 
level.  
De-radicalization efforts in Canada have not adequately incorporated community 
relationships, nor have they proactively or reactively addressed identity issues that may 
influence the radicalization process. Without these community-based connections, some 
vulnerable youth may continue to be recruited as foreign fighters or incited to commit 












prevent violent extremism, youth de-radicalization in Canada is best served through a 




The research was supported by a central question and three supporting questions to 
find effective practices for youth de-radicalization in Canada. Interviews and a comparative 
analysis between Canada and the UK were conducted to find these practices. These elements 
included the family, school, religious organizations, community, and the government. 
Incorporating practices derived from an exploration of the successes and failures of different 
approaches can create a better system overall and effectively contribute to de-radicalization 
efforts within Canada. For these reasons, the following questions directed this research: 
Central Research Question 
1. What effective practices can be incorporated into Canadian youth de-radicalization 
approaches? 
Supporting Research Questions 
1. How can de-radicalization approaches from the United Kingdom be adapted for use in 
Canada?  
2. What lessons can be learned from current Canadian de-radicalization approaches? 
3. What is role of the family, community, religious organizations and government in 
youth de-radicalization in Canada? 
 
Definition of Terms 
 
 Due to the subjective definitions contained within the research, numerous terms had to 













 The transitional age of youth needs to be operationalized in the context of youth de-
radicalization to ensure validity. The United Nations Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs (UNDESA) (2013) defined youth between the ages of 15 to 24 and understood this as 
“a period of transition from the dependence of childhood to adulthood’s independence . . . as 
members of a community” (UNDESA, 2013). The Canadian legal definition of adulthood 
does not account for the formative years of growth, including the development of extremist 
ideology. Gaudet (2007) also contended that youth is a fluid and transitional period and does 
not halt at the age of 18. In fact, “the symbolic age of majority (age 18) is but one of 
numerous benchmarks along the path to adulthood” (p. 18). With de-radicalization 
techniques, the youth’s life-course must be analyzed with the formation of their identity. 
Therefore, age 15 to 24 encompasses the transition to adulthood “within a temporal context in 
order to avoid categorization that disregards the conditions that led them to experience various 
types of transitions” (p. 19). This demographic also marks the beginning of self-autonomy, 
which can place youth at risk and cause feelings of isolation from support networks (p. 19), 
increasing the risk of radicalization and requiring de-radicalization techniques. 
Radicalization 
 The definition of radicalization in the literature differs from those offered by 
institutions and government agencies. While the Canadian government has defined 
radicalization as a process (RCMP, 2011), scholars have offered definitions that vary within 
temporal and global contexts. Definitions varied from simply describing radicalization as a 
“process of developing extremist ideology and beliefs” (Özerdem & Podder, 2011) to a 
“movement in the direction of supporting or enacting radical behaviour” (Kruglanski et al., 
2014, p. 70). Due to this variance, the study combines interpretation in literature from 
Özerdem and Podder (2011) that radicalization is a process and from Bartlett and Miller 












the process of forming an extremist view that has a high propensity to result in violent 
attitudes or violent action. 
De-Radicalization 
 De-radicalization in literature has focused on general approaches and provided less 
attention to a working definition. Despite this, some soft explanations of de-radicalization 
have been offered. Dechesne (2011) believed de-radicalization sought “to prevent further 
escalation of violence” and “creates the conditions conducive to dialogue” (p. 287). However, 
Dechesne’s (2011) definition lacked an explanation on what the process actually involved. 
Porges (2011) alluded to this gap, stating that “no single model of deradicalization is 
universally applicable” (p. 2). De-radicalization has often been viewed as the reverse process 
of radicalization, but the concept can be vague and subjective in its meaning. Porta and Lafree 
(2012) asserted that the de-radicalization process had two components that were often 
overlooked or conflated. One part contained the “de-radicalization of attitudes and beliefs” 
and the other included “the disengagement from violent behaviour and the process of leaving 
violent groups and reintegrating into other social groups” (Porta & LaFree, 2012, p. 7). El-
Said (2015) agreed that de-radicalization referred to disengagement from violence: de-
radicalization is “a package of policies and measures designed and implemented by 
authorities in order to normalize and convince groups and individuals who have already 
become radicalized or violent extremists to repent and disengage from violence” (p. 10). De-
radicalization can also be effective without the need for a formalized program and “may not 
require any coordinated action to get it underway” (Dechesne, 2011, p. 288). Drawing from 
these viewpoints, the definition for de-radicalization for this study is the following: 
A formal or informal approach aimed at reducing commitment to an extremist 













Conceptual and Theoretical Framework: Social Identity Theory 
 This research is based upon the principles of Social Identity Theory that asserts youth 
seek belonging within a group, which comprises their identity and worldview. Creating this 
belonging may have the power to inform an identity that is resilient to the false promises that 
radicalization may hold. Social Identity Theory explores how individuals identify in reference 
to a group and how this connection allows the individual to relate to the social world through 
belonging (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The social construction of this belonging requires an in-
group and the out-group. Essentially, different groups within society divide between an “us 
versus them” mentality, where “group members of an in-group will seek to find negative 
aspects of an out-group, thus enhancing their self-image” (McLeod, 2008). This type of social 
framing can lead to issues like racism, extreme beliefs about an opposing group, or 
discrimination (McLeod, 2008). While attempting to find counters for radicalization, research 
and policy in Canada dedicated little to create spaces where youth could build this resiliency 
or offering group belonging to curb radicalization. With young Muslims, Abbas (2007) 
believed that youth had multiple identities in Western society, and these played a decisive role 
in radicalization. These youth faced the challenge of “trying to negotiate multiple identities 
across ethnic, social, and religious dimensions,” thus complicating their identity in relation to 
society (Abbas, 2007, pp. 3-4). Costanza (2015) elaborated further that this identity crisis is 
one of the core considerations in de-radicalization research: “For some, the path towards 
finding a stable identity in the midst of an often hostile sociocultural environment has led 
them to accept radical interpretations of Islam that provide them with a personal sense of 
safety, security, and self-worth” (Costanza, 2015, p. 1). This could be the missing link in 
creating an effective de-radicalization program that addresses these intangible issues. 
 
Literature Review  
 
The literature review contains a general overview of de-radicalization approaches in 
Canada and considers theoretical approach and practice. These guiding principles are an 












between Canada and the UK, this section will also include a critical analysis of the UK’s de-
radicalization program to find key processes that would benefit the Canadian approach. 
Within the literature, de-radicalization programs and approach take different shape and 
contain different focus. Through the review of this literature, it can be found that these factors 
can inhibit or promote a successful de-radicalization program.  
 
The Canadian Context of De-Radicalization 
 Homegrown terrorism has been a developing concern in Canada, as radicalization has 
appeared to increase in recent years (Chin, 2015, p. 21). With knowledge of this threat, 
Canada has focused de-radicalization programs on those “who have not yet crossed the line 
into violent extremism or terrorist acts” (p. 21). Canada’s formal efforts to counter violent 
extremism were initiated with the formation of the Integrated National Security Enforcement 
Teams (INSETs) in 2002, with a mandate to enhance the capacity and intelligence-sharing 
among partners within provincial and municipal police departments (RCMP, 2014). While the 
objective of INSETs is “to ensure the effective and timely investigation of national security 
threats” (PSC, 2013), consultation with communities was noticeably absent from the 
initiative. In 2010, Public Safety Canada (PSC), with collaboration from 18 government 
departments and agencies, initiated the Combating Violent Extremism Working Group 
(CVEWG) with the objective of “information-exchange and collaboration” to prevent violent 
extremism (Monaghan, 2014, p. 491). With many youth getting drawn into ideologies and 
joining groups abroad, the Canadian response to the threat of radicalization is to “counter a 
very effective extremist ideological marketing” (Kilford, 2014).  
 Regional Canadian programs include the Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization 
Leading to Violence (CPRLV). CPRLV was established in March 2015 by the City of 
Montreal to serve Montreal and Quebec area as a non-profit organization. The aim of CPRLV 
was to work with individuals who were at-risk of radicalization leading to violence (CPRLV, 
2016a). The agency contains three different subdivisions including prevention and skills 












prevention rather than repression and provides support rather than stigmatizing individuals 
and communities” (CPRLV, 2016b). The goal of CPRLV (2016b) was to reroute cases out of 
the judicial system by providing psychological resources as an alternative. CPRLV (2016c) 
provides a 24/7 hotline and some useful online tools and guides such as the behaviour 
barometer to recognize behaviour symptoms of radicalization leading to violence.  
 Another program within Canada is the ReDirect program. This was an initiative 
established by Calgary Police Department in the fall of 2014 as a “prevention and education 
program aimed at youth and young adults vulnerable to becoming radicalized, before they 
develop extremist ideologies or intentions” (Calgary Police Department, 2016a). A 
representative from ReDirect stated that individuals in the program participate consensually, 
and are typically 12 to 24 years of age. Similar to CPRLV, ReDirect relies on confidential 
referrals and does not attribute radicalization to one particular group. Given strict policies on 
revealing referral rates within the program, the ReDirect representative could not provide 
these statistics. This policy exists to prevent stigmatization and the misinterpretation of data 
and perception from the general public. ReDirect portrays its initiative as an educational and 
awareness hub to stop the radicalization of young people through prevention programs with 
the main goal to seek out vulnerabilities in youth and promote improvement (Calgary Police 
Department, 2016b). For those that have accelerated in the process of radicalization, the 
program serves as a resource for an exit strategy. According to the ReDirect representative, 
primary funding originates from the Calgary Police Service and the City of Calgary through 
Calgary Neighbourhood Services.  
Since CPRLV and ReDirect are relatively new programs, their work has not been 
covered extensively in the literature, other than what has been offered by CPRLV or the 
Calgary Police. Therefore, it is difficult to evaluate their long-term effectiveness and success. 
While the number of referrals do not necessarily reflect the success of the programs, it is 












Theoretical Approaches of De-Radicalization 
Theoretical applications of de-radicalization are conflicted in literature, including 
variances between Western and Middle Eastern de-radicalization programs. Western de-
radicalization programs were focused on economic assistance, counselling, and placed little 
emphasis on ideological concerns linked to de-radicalization (Koehler, 2015, p. 127; 
Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013, pp. 99-100). Conversely, Middle East state-run programs “heavily 
rely on a theological component” (Koehler, 2015, p. 127). Dalgaard-Nielsen (2013) argued 
that these theological-based programs were ineffective and instead programs should focus on 
issues where the participant already feels doubt (p. 108). Despite these differences, 
similarities between Western and Middle Eastern programs did exist, in that “go-betweens” 
were usually employed including “religious scholars, repentant terrorists, or family members” 
to provide greater influence on the participant and to facilitate long-term de-radicalization 
(Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013, p. 100).  
State-run programs were also issues, in that “government agencies might also not be 
the right partners” for de-radicalization, as their interests could be perceived as a bid to gain 
“intelligence and informants” (Koehler, 2015, p. 126). The numerous de-radicalization 
programs represent the need to counter radicalization and policymakers have been 
increasingly concerned about this issue, triggering a “number of government efforts” (Upal, 
2015, p. 138). This includes the government of Turkey, where one approach involved an 
“outreach program administered by the national police” and another that ”tries to promote the 
correct interpretation of Islam and is administered by the Religious Affairs Office . . . of the 
Government of Turkey (Ekici, 2015, p. 176). Canada’s formation of de-radicalization 
approaches is similar, as they have mostly been government or police-based in practice. 
Jacoby (2016) believed that Canada’s long history of community policing promoted practices 
of human rights and good governance (p. 294), and consequently, the Ministry of Public 
Safety and the RCMP are “charged with taking the lead in de-radicalization programs” (p. 
295). However, there has been a gap in community service provision offered by the 












Canada have thus taken it upon themselves to educate the public, provide social services and 
liaise with government agencies” (p. 295). Canada and other Western countries also had to be 
cognizant in implementing a de-radicalization program that focuses on ideology or religion, as 
they were presumably protectors of free speech and had to be “very careful not to include an 
ideological component to their work” (Koehler, 2015, p. 131).  
Programs for de-radicalizing youth are also varied in approach. Some programs 
contained an overt focus on religion, which can place disproportionate blame on minorities. 
Ekici (2015) cautioned against focusing on minorities, especially associating Islam with 
terrorism or as the sole cause for radicalization. Calling terrorism “Islamic” could serve to 
offend Muslims with media perpetuating this labelling (p. 174). In fact, Ekici (2015) noted 
that Muslims might feel that terrorism is not associated with other radical ideologies or 
religions, and the media abstained from associating terrorism with Christians or Jews or uses 
labels such as “Christian terrorism” or “Jewish terrorism” (p. 174). Upal (2015) asserted that 
this type of focus negated the effect of Muslim identity on de-radicalization and that counters 
should focus on what alternatives can be given to Muslims who are attracted to the Jihadi 
narrative (p. 152). 
In terms of the philosophical and theoretical approach to de-radicalization programs, 
identity theory was often used as a foundation in literature and research, as they are “widely 
known and extensively researched but are also cross-culturally applicable to virtually all 
social interactions” (Williams & Lindsey, 2014, p. 137). These identities needed to be 
reconstructed in the de-radicalization process to create a long-term and sustainable change 
within the individual. In addition, many authors believed identity was a key element in de-
radicalization, and that it informed why individuals had difficulty moving on from a 
radicalized group (Harris, 2010; Altier, Thoroughgood, & Horgan, 2014; Bovenkerk, 2011). 
Identity also pointed to the need for pro-social bonds that could reinforce disengagement from 
radicalized beliefs. In fact, identity in the form of pro-social bonds that were crucial to de-
radicalization (Altier, Boyle, Shortland, & Horgan, 2017, p. 310). These included “stable 












issue explored in the literature review was the focus on de-radicalization was the important 
role of building relationships to prevent misconceptions or misunderstandings of why 
radicalization occurs.  
Chin (2015) emphasized the importance of including religious communities in 
discussion on de-radicalization, and implement broad prevention practices “that are inclusive, 
consultative, and address the grievances and issues of all minority groups so they feel less 
marginalized” (p. 22). In fact, building relationships between police and minorities could 
promote cooperation and maintain “effective communication and access to information” (p. 
20). As demonstrated by Rabasa, Pettyjohn, Ghez, and Boueck (2010), de-radicalization 
programs need to build their programs based on these local populations and stakeholders: 
The best designed plans leverage local cultural patterns to achieve their objectives. 
One implication of this observation is that deradicalisation programs cannot simply be 
translated from one country to another, even within the same region. They have to 
develop organically in a specific country and culture. (Rabasa et al, 2010). 
Building on this approach, Chin (2015) agreed that community-based initiatives had the 
ability to enhance the capacity of the community, promote positive leadership, and promote 
alternative activities to radicalization (p. 125) and had to be “long-term orientated and lasting” 
(Koehler, 2015, p. 125). The community-based approach was sorely needed, but some 
communities would be unable to “confront radical elements on their own without assistance 
from police” (Chin, 2015, p. 20). Education was also touted as having an impact in de-
radicalization. Veenkamp and Zeiger (2015) believed the support of families coupled with a 
focus on educational institutions could build resiliency within communities. These 
educational institutions needed to promote and teach “critical thinking skills, civic education, 
community engagement and volunteerism in schools,” which could “help address the drivers 
of violent extremism in certain countries” (Veenkamp & Zeiger, 2015, p. 153). However, 
education could possibly have little effect in de-radicalization, as studies in the UK proposed 
that those involved in extremism tended to be youth “who were enrolled in full-time 












(2016) postulated that family was an important foundation for Canada specifically, and noted 
that “everyone plays a part in keeping our communities safe” (p. 290). These wide-ranging 
theoretical approaches to de-radicalization in general demonstrated the need for community-
based programing. While there have been numerous studies on de-radicalization, very few 
studies have addressed programs “working in the pre-criminal space” (Koehler, 2016, p. 29). 
Despite having programs centred on de-radicalizing before planned violence occurs, there 
remains a significant knowledge gap on this pre-criminal space that this study serves to 
address and build upon. Altier, Boyle, Shortland and Horgan (2017) also criticized past 
studies for containing a narrow focus on a specific terrorist group or region (p. 309). Other 
authors agreed that de-radicalization is complex but many failed to articulate how this 
program would be applied and how Canada specifically could adapt other approaches to find 
a process that is in line within a Canadian perspective.  
De-Radicalization Practices in the United Kingdom (UK) 
The UK created the Channel program, as part of the Prevent strategy in response to 
increasing rates of radicalization. The initiative came into effect as part of the British 
government’s post 9/11 counterterrorism strategy “aimed at stopping people becoming 
terrorists” (Gayle, 2016). The UK government stated that the program is “about ensuring that 
vulnerable children or adults of any faith, ethnicity, or background receive support before 
their vulnerabilities are exploited by those that would want them to embrace terrorism” (HM 
Government, 2015, p. 7). The approach is “based on studies that have looked at sample 
groups of convicted terrorists and developed an elaborate assessment framework for 
ascertaining ‘vulnerability factors’ that are either causally related to or at least correlate with 
all of the individuals’ psychologies” (Ali, 2015, p. 2). Since the British government made it a 
“statutory duty” to report and refer individuals at-risk of being radicalized, frontline workers 
are obliged to create referrals (p. 3). Through this program, individuals who are identified, 
screened and determined to be at risk of radicalization may be referred to counselling, faith 
guidance, civic and political engagement, engaging with support networks, social housing, 












 There has been some criticism about the Channel program, as the UK’s approach to 
de-radicalization could actually “promote extremism, rather than countering it” (Gayle, 2016). 
In 2015, there were 3,955 people referred to the program by frontline workers including 
teachers, which made an average of 11 referrals a day (Halliday, 2016). Referrals of children 
nine and under was one of the main criticisms, with the youngest being four-years-old 
(Halliday, 2016). The problematic rationale to refer children at a young age challenges the 
strength of the program and questions the real priorities of the Channel program. Thomas 
(2010) found the UK’s approach deteriorated into specific focuses on ethnic groups, “rather 
than developing a focus on positive relations between communities” (p. 442). Even though the 
UK engaged with some communities, there were still issues in the outcome. As discussed by 
Briggs (2010), community consultation within the Prevent strategy seemed superficial and 
actually did little to work with communities on de-radicalization: “local authorities engaged 
selectively with communities, and that decisions continued to be made behind closed doors 
with little or no community involvement” (p. 976).  Some Muslims have also voiced concern 
that the Channel program works against Muslim communities, many of whom continue to 
believe that it is “essentially a tool for intelligence-gathering or spying” (Chin, 2015, p. 13). 
This focus on Muslim communities was also a source of confusion within the Prevent 
program itself and whether it should exclusively focus on Muslim threats or include violence 
waged by extreme right-wing groups (Briggs, 2010, p. 977).  
 Despite these concerns, the UK has attempted to include education in their de-
radicalization strategy. The government also used funding to strengthen resiliency in “local 
communities through the Muslim community and youth groups and initiatives” (Stevens, 
2011, p. 168). However, these initiatives proved meaningless, as the singular focus on the 
Muslim community led to the assumption that the entire Muslim community was at risk of 
violent extremism and radicalization (p. 168). Briggs (2010) believed that de-radicalization 
approaches should focus on all “fragile communities, not just Muslims” (p. 972). While the 
focus of the UK program is commendable, its execution of this principle was misguided and 













De-radicalization programs are often formulated with an subjective understanding of 
the root causes of radicalization and the subsequent corrective action to these causes. At 
times, these understandings are linked to religion or ethnic groups and fail to consider the 
weight of other social factors that may affect youth. Depending on the causes of 
radicalization, the UK may centre their initiative on this understanding, which can make 
programs ineffective or successful. It also demonstrated the valuable practice of including 
stakeholders who regularly interact with youth, as group inclusion and interaction can 
influence youth identity and ideals. The UK de-radicalization approach demonstrated a 
disconnect from this understanding by instigating fear of discussing these ideas through 
mandatory reporting of “radical” individuals. With Canadian de-radicalization programs, 
more analysis is required to properly gauge their success. However, these programs appear to 
be on the track of educating youth on alternatives and attempt to shape identity through 
belonging and engagement. As for the UK approach, it remains that diverse stakeholders need 




The research has utilized qualitative methodology in the form of case studies. The 
qualitative collective case study allowed for the exploration of youth de-radicalization by 
using different sources to collect data (Baxter and Jack, 2008). The methodology was also 
chosen to encompass the circumstantial context of youth de-radicalization. An advantage of 
this type of case study is finding common trends and features between cases (Goddard, 2010, 
p. 4). In addition to primary data, the UK was selected for further analysis and is later 
analyzed for successful practices in the discussion section of this research. Case study 
selection of this country was based on the principles formulated by Seawright and Gerring 
(2008). As previously mentioned in the introduction, the UK model of de-radicalization is 













Requests for semi-structured interviews were sent to 36 potential participants from 
three different categories. These categories include 1) religious leaders, 2) secondary school 
counsellors, and 3) academics from different disciplines (international conflict and policy, 
radicalization, de-radicalization, and youth resilience). Out of the 36 requests, 19 participants 
agreed and completed the interview. Among the 19 participants was a representative from the 
Centre for Prevention for Radicalization Leading to Violence in Montreal, Quebec and a 
representative from the ReDirect program in Calgary, Alberta. Dr. Lorne Dawson, a Professor 
of Sociology and Legal Studies and Co-Director for the Canadian Network for Research on 
Terrorism, Security, and Society (TSAS), was also interviewed as an expert on de-
radicalization subject matter. Data was collected until data saturation was reached, as 
interviews were completed with each of the three categories until no new evidence or insights 
were uncovered (Creswell, 2014, p. 189). The interviews took place in four different 
communication types: five via Skype, two via e-mail, two via telephone, and ten in-person at 
a location that was convenient for the participant. Once participants agreed to be involved in 
the study, an informed consent form was sent for the participant’s review to allow time for 
questions before the interview. All participants agreed to the content of the informed consent 
form and signed. The average interview time was 60 minutes. 
 The objective of the semi-structured interview was to discover extensive information 
about de-radicalization and uncover themes among participant responses. More importantly, 
this type of interview contained open-ended questions and that allowed participants to express 
their opinions within the 60 to 90-minute time allotment. The interactive approach allowed for 
discussion of participant experiences with radicalization and de-radicalization, as well as 
highlighting their understanding of why youth may radicalize. During the semi-structured 
interview process, and with the participant’s permission, the conversation was recorded with a 
digital recorder.  
 To ensure anonymity, participants were divided into categories. The only link between 












protected file within encrypted software. Only the researcher had access to participant names. 
During the research process participants are referred to as the following: 
1. Religious clerks: R1, R2, R3... 
2. School Counsellors: S1, S2, S3... 
3. Academics: A1, A2, A3... 
The anonymity conditions were waived from Dr. Lorne Dawson, CPRLV, and ReDirect with 
express consent from the participants. These conditions were also approved by the Royal 
Roads University Ethics Office. After all interviews had been completed, raw data was 
manually transcribed from the audio recording. Once the data was transcribed, it was 
uploaded to NVivo software for coding.   
Participant Selection Criteria  
 Participant selection was based on three qualification criteria and was sourced from 
the categories of school counsellor, religious leader, or academic. The participant required 
extensive knowledge in one of the three areas to be selected for participation: experience 
working with youth for at least 15 years, academic research or knowledge of the subject of 
radicalization or de-radicalization, or intimate knowledge of religious teachings and practices.  
 School counsellors were selected due to their direct interaction with youth during the 
development phase of youth identity. Counsellors may be the first to observe youth challenges 
within the school system. Two out of five school counsellors interviewed had worked with 
radicalized youth in the past. In total, six out of the 19 participants had direct experience with 
radicalized youth. Religious leaders were selected for their role in the community and their 
valuable insight on problems facing their communities, as well as solutions. All interviewed 
religious leaders self-identified as belonging to the Jewish, Christian, and Muslim faith. 
Academics from the listed disciplines were selected for their background in research on the 














The researcher applied thematic analysis to evaluate primary data from participants. 
This included collecting raw data from interviews, consolidating and preparing data for 
analysis, reading through data points, coding the data with thematic analysis methods, 
identifying themes and descriptions, and interpreting the meaning of the coded data (Creswell, 
2014, p. 185). To compile and code data, the researcher utilized NVivo software. Each 
recorded interview was transcribed, with the final document being uploaded to NVivo. The 
researcher completed an overview of all participant input to find emerging themes. After this 
was completed, themes were defined and relevant passages were coded in their respective 
theme.  
Research Limitations 
A limitation of this research is that youth were not engaged or interviewed. Potential 
harm could have resulted in their participation in this research. The harm could include re-
traumatization, and if the youth disclosed sensitive information during an interview, the 
researcher would have to break confidentiality and report to authorities. These types of 
circumstances would include a direct or indirect threat to the well-being of the youth or 
others. The harm also includes the potential of revealing the youth’s lifestyle and personal 
views to their community, which could destabilize the youth and further cause radicalized 
views. Funding for travel was also a limitation of this research. However, with the use of in-
person, online, and telephone communication methods, participants were reached without the 
need for a travel budget. 
Another limitation of de-radicalization study is that results cannot be applied 
universally to other cases. Findings that were collected could have yielded different results if 
collected in different regions and could even differ within Western countries. The subjective 
matter of the study also could vary individually and regionally within Canada. Although steps 
were taken to reduce the effect on the research in terms of sourcing participants from across 














 There were several ethical considerations within the research. First was that the Royal 
Roads University Ethics Office accepted the study. As stipulated by the Ethics Office, the 
subjects of this research were not contacted until the Ethics Office approved the ethical 
review submitted by the researcher. As part of this study, participants were informed that their 
interviews were to be audio-recorded and all 19 participants agreed to this element of the 
research. After this data had been recorded, all identifying information from participants was 
omitted from the transcript. By maintaining honesty and openness with participants, this 
allowed for an open discussion on sensitive issues surrounding radicalization and de-
radicalization. While participants did discuss their experiences, names of individual cases 




 Primary data findings included in-depth interviews with school counsellors, religious 
leaders from different faith groups, and academics involved in research and fieldwork 
pertaining to youth, resilience, and education. Through the semi-structured interview, 
participants were asked what contributes to youth radicalization in Canada and how these 
factors can be addressed. The possible causes of radicalization among youth were included in 
primary data to create a contextual understanding of how youth form extremist views within 
Canada. Dismissing this data set would be irrational, considering that a successful de-
radicalization approach may be based upon the root causes of radicalization. Questions 
presented to participants discussed the incorporation of religion in de-radicalization efforts, 
including the role of family, school, community, and government in youth de-radicalization.  
Characteristics of Radicalized Youth 
 Seven out of the 19 participants have direct experience with youth radicalization, and 












psychology, research, or other frontline roles as youth service provider. While there were 
some different opinions on the characteristics of radicalized youth, 83% of participants 
discussed the feeling of belonging and disenfranchisement. Participant R1 explained that 
youth who are vulnerable to radicalization “are not very outgoing-- you know there are 
exceptions to this, but generally speaking, they don't have a large circle of friends and they're 
not usually very popular at school, and they are kind of isolated individuals” (Participant R1). 
While participants elaborated on the existence of these characteristics, some argued that these 
can be unseen and unnoticed. When asked about experiences with radicalized youth, 
Participant S4 provided an example on this issue:  
Yes, one of my students. I’m reading the paper about it and I wasn’t expecting it. 
What created that need for him to go back and fight with ISIS? Was it something that 
happened to him? I was shocked and disappointed. It wasn’t what I expected of this 
young man. There was nothing that I could pinpoint where I thought he might lean 
that way. . . That’s upsetting for me. What was the trigger? He was having a typical 
transition and showed no signs. My relationship with him gave no indication of his 
choice; he had a vision for himself. (Participant S4) 
Contributing Factors into Radicalization  
 Five themes were discussed by participants as contributing factors into youth 
radicalization including media distortion, mental health, the perception and narrative of 
Muslims as the “other” in society, socio-economic issues, and foreign policy.  
Media Distortion 
 Nine participants made 18 references about media distortion and how this is related to 
youth radicalization. Participant A1 believed that media profiled terrorists or radicals and 
implied these individuals originated from one particular group of people: 
Is there a profile of who they are? They can be white, born and raised in Christian 












Indigenous cultures in different parts of the world. It just so happens, I think that now, 
unfortunately so much of this gets labelled as Islamic, which is not accurate when 
looking all over the world where these things happen and incidents are happening in 
North America or Europe where the religion of the person is not even mentioned. The 
British MP [Jo Cox] who was killed a couple days ago, they haven't mentioned the 
religion of the person who shot her. (Participant A1) 
Participant R1 offered that interaction with the media is a community responsibility and this 
interaction would provide the other narrative to a media story. Participant R2 stated “to be 
fair, it is also the job of the Muslim communities to engage with the media, which they are not 
doing as much as they should,” and offered that mosques could change the dynamic of media 
by engaging with media outlets to tell their narrative. Failure to work with the media could 
have a negative impact of creating perceived injustices among Muslim youth (Participant R1). 
Formal media is not the only outlet criticized by participants, but also social media and the 
globalized communications in general. Participant R4 elaborated on these issues:  
The world right now is the internet world and people have access to all kinds of 
speeches and are listening to different types of scholars. Positive, negative, moderate, 
radical. So when they see these types of things, these images in the media, and then 
they-- on the other hand, find these scholars using that as a template to provoke them 
and to basically brainwash them and to make them join this type militancy. And then 
basically it becomes the-- also further fuel to fire. (Participant R4) 
Participant A3 also identified these discrepancies in media, where the religion of extreme 
right-wing groups who committed violence was omitted from media reports. Building on that, 
Participant S1 suggested that media distortion is used by radical violent extremist groups as 
propaganda to promote the idea that “the West is against us.” Social media was used as a tool 
to support extremist agenda in convincing youth that the West is against them, especially 













 Seven participants made 21 references to mental health as a component of 
radicalization, but not all agreed on its role. Five school counsellors agreed that mental health 
is a prominent factor in the process of youth radicalization, while religious leaders had 
varying viewpoints on its contribution to the process. As for academics, the majority agreed 
that mental health does play a role, but the extent varied depending on the individual. 
Participant A3 explained: 
I think definitely mental health plays a role, but again, I wouldn't say always. I 
wouldn't say 100% of the time or even 80% of the time . . . mental health stuff does 
come into this, especially things like depression. (Participant A3) 
Another participant with a background in counselling psychology added that mental health 
issues can prevent youth and families from seeking services due to stigma about bad 
parenting: 
Given that I'm a counsellor and there's really connection between that and mental 
illness, so that really strong sort of stigma up against having mental illness, and also 
that stigma-- understandably so-- my son or daughter, my child, might be at risk for 
radicalization and what that might do in attracting all kinds of negative stigma and 
blame for the family, blaming the parent for that. No one wants to put themselves in a 
position in which people might perceive them to be a threat. (Participant S1) 
Two participants from the religious leader category presented a different opinion on the 
weight of mental health as a contributor to radicalization. Participant R2 dismissed the notion 
of mental health as a causal factor but acknowledged that there was a correlation between 













 Participants argued that socio-economic factors had relatively little effect compared to 
other causes. Participant R1 believed that the economic orientation of a community could 
increase the role of socio-economics in radicalization; however, its role was limited:  
The segment of Muslim professionals is actually increasing and this [economically 
disadvantaged] segment is decreasing. So it does play a role but at the same time, I 
don't believe it plays as great a role as some people would think. (Participant R1) 
Another participant discussed three issues relating to socio-economics could influence 
radicalization, stating that “if we look elsewhere at other Western democracies, essentially 
three aspects which interplay on . . . radicalization into violence. One is sort of systemic 
issues. These are issues related to ideas about poverty, lack of opportunity, lack of 
employment” (Participant A4).  
Foreign Policy 
 Seven references were made to foreign policy as a driver for youth radicalization. 
Certain youth are unable to articulate their anger at foreign policy decisions that they perceive 
is attacking their identity or other groups that share their identity. Participant R1 explained 
that 
It's usually misinformation that is happening over here that, for example, the foreign 
policy of the land that they are living in, sometimes conflicts with their faith . . . the 
Government of Canada is at war with certain nations that are predominantly Muslim. 
So if the youth grow up seeing this, and there's nobody to show them how to channel 
their emotions using the proper avenues, then they are going to channel their emotions 
somewhere. (Participant R1) 
Participants that discussed the influence of foreign policy believed that violent extremists 
groups like ISIS would exploit this narrative in order to recruit youth. Participant R2 












2014 to changes in foreign policy and involvement in the Middle East: “This occurred after 
the West went into the Middle East. Pre-2003, there wasn’t a suicide bombing, now 2003 to 
2014, there have been 892 that took place. Something drastically changed and was very 
wrong. A lot of that may be stemmed in foreign policy” (Participant R2).  
 This motivation to act and respond to the foreign policy among youth is illustrated 
through an example given by Participant A1 during her work in Pakistan. When droning 
strikes were carried out in Pakistan by the United States, the coverage by media was sparse, 
even after these attacks internally displaced people and destroyed numerous institutions. 
Drone strikes were utilized to the point where schools were never in operation because of the 
level of bombing (Participant A1). Participant A1 believed these types of foreign policies 
could cause youth to form and develop radical extremist ideas that could lead to violence.   
Muslims as the ‘Other’ 
 Six participants discussed the notion of ‘Muslims as the Other,’ and how that 
generates a radicalized reaction among youth. Participant A4 explained this notion or feeling 
is sometimes generated and caused by state actors: 
When the United Kingdom settled what is still it's Prevent program, one of the things 
they realized after a couple of years was that sending police officers to local 
community meetings or meet with local community leaders or teachers or whoever, . . 
. saying to that community, we want to talk to you about radicalization leading to 
violence and the threat of terrorism, was a very bad opening move by the law 
enforcement and police community. Because what it did, or at least what we 
understand it did, was it put the local communities on edge and apprehensive straight 
away because it signaled or it was interpreted as a signal of two things: first that you're 
targeting us as a community, and that's problematic. The second thing is you're 













Participant R6 tied the notion of ‘Muslims as the Other’ to identity issues and how it can 
shape youth individuality and serve as a factor in radicalization. The participant sympathized 
with those labelled due to ignorance and racism: 
I can’t imagine growing up and people saying you look like you’re from this terrorist 
group. Is there a point where the kid says “well screw it, that’s what you think of me 
then I’ll do it.” But I think what people think of us does matter. When we’re searching 
for identity, who am I? And what are my values, they’re so malleable and so 
vulnerable in teenage years. (Participant R6) 
A school counsellor agreed that labelling youth in this way would force them into that label 
instead of defining their identity on their terms (Participant S2). This was explained further by 
another school counsellor from a psychological perspective, emphasizing on the need for 
belonging:  
When someone is not feeling like they’re part of something-- feeling connected, 
feeling disconnected from a majority group, having a sense of “other” somehow, a 
family generally feeling wronged-- it might make an individual consider what else 
they could be part of to feel connected. (Participant S3)  
Factors of De-radicalization  
 All the nineteen participants made 77 references to belonging and engagement and 32 
references to education as the two main vehicles of youth de-radicalization in Canada. The 
role of religious leaders was also frequently mentioned in supporting belonging and education 
with 31 references, and then the role of school came second with 22 references. Family, 
community, and the government play a lesser role compared to the other listed players. In 
fact, there was a common agreement that the role of government should be limited to funding 
and evaluating the impact of foreign policies on local citizens and society. Figure 2 













Figure 1: Factors Contributing to De-Radicalization 
Creation of Safe Spaces: Belonging and Engagement 
 Belonging and engagement, the most referenced theme in the research, was discussed 
extensively by participants. There were also numerous references to creating a safe space for 
youth that might be at-risk of radicalization. Participant A4 elaborated on how this space was 
needed for community members who were concerned for the well-being of the youth. Other 
participants discussed the lack of spaces for these young people to engage with their 
communities. Participant A3 contended that extremist groups that recruit youth can create 
these faux spaces: “Radicalization seems like a viable option and let’s face it: radicalized 
groups do an excellent job of creating a space, a welcoming space, for young people” 
(Participant A3). For de-radicalization, these spaces need to be created to give youth a chance 
to discuss their frustrations with a trusted adult (Participant A3). This has to be carefully 
facilitated with a trusted member of the community that can relate to youth: 
It’s about creating a space for young people, you are . . . saying how you are actually 
doing and realizing “I’m actually safe here, physically and emotionally.” It takes 












Young people are able to be really authentic and honest about who they are. And they 
won’t be shamed, silenced for being depressed. (Participant R6) 
Multiple participants echoed that belonging was a key de-radicalization factor and prevented 
youth from seeking out alternative avenues to achieve this belonging. Participant S3 detailed 
how schools can allow youth to feel this inclusion: 
People that have hope, that perceive an opportunity and feel connected to their 
surroundings, will embrace those opportunities. If there are factors that don’t help 
them feel hope or a feeling of satisfaction, they will look to an alternative means to 
feel whatever that is. (Participant S3) 
Education 
 Participants supported youth education through dialogue, which encouraged youth to 
consider different narratives and viewpoints. Participant A5 stated that creating a dialogue 
with youth promotes this type of resiliency needed to deflect radicalization while allowing 
them to “gain a better comprehension of the phenomenon and its dynamics” (Participant A5). 
Education also had a role in de-radicalization and shifting values of a radicalized individual. 
Participant A2 stated that de-radicalization involved the reversal of values gained during the 
process of radicalization, which occurred through educating the youth on what values they 
gained by becoming radical (Participant A2). Allowing for different views within the de-
radicalization process can push the youth to seek other perspectives of an issue that has 
radicalized them: 
It’s exposure to different ideas. In getting our information from the media, there’s a 
part of it that isn’t human and if we don’t have human contact or exposure that 
challenges us, . . . it’s easy to embed yourself and be stuck there. (Participant S3) 
Other participants noted the term “de-radicalization” should be avoided in educational 












The Role of Religious Leaders 
 14 participants made 31 references to the role of religious leaders in providing 
religious counselling and a counter-discourse to extremist views. Participant A5 emphasized 
that religious leaders need to address radicalized youth, as others outside the religion may not 
have the perceived legitimacy for the youth to openly discuss religious views. Other 
participants also pointed out the uncomfortable notion that extremists groups like ISIS claim 
their violence in the name of religion: 
ISIS and similar groups like the Taliban, very explicitly link their calls for violence to 
their religion, so the religious links cannot be dismissed, given the devastating 
consequences of the growth of ISIS . . . It is convenient to say, “this has nothing to do 
with religion,” but ISIS adherents clearly do not feel that way, and this fact must be 
addressed head on. (Participant A6) 
Religious leaders in the study also noted their upbringing in Canada better suited them to 
relate to youth that are at risk of radicalization (Participant R1). It was noted that the age gap 
between religious leaders and youth could also change the dynamic in discussing issues that 
affect Muslim youth: 
I can very easily relate to their struggles and what they’re going through because I 
grew up in the same country. Now, I did spend a period of time studying abroad, but 
that doesn’t change the fact that I went to school here, I grew up here, I share many of 
the same interests as this age group. So it is much easier for me to communicate with 
them and also them to accept a message from somebody who they might see as a, at 
least, their counterpart age-wise or generation-wise, if not knowledge-wise. 
(Participant R1) 
A school counsellor also noted the importance of condemning violence as a value to achieve 
political or religious goals (Participant S1). Religious leaders need to make it very clear to 












The Role of School 
 The school environment serves as a place to connect with at-risk youth. Most 
participants contended that schools had a role to play in developing youth well-being as an 
indirect de-radicalization method; however, existing gaps could jeopardize the strengthening 
of resiliency (Participant A2). A counsellor working within a Canadian school noted that 
addressing youth in the school setting was necessary to create an environment where they 
could approach adults to discuss problems or struggles (Participant S1). Participant S1 also 
acknowledged the role of staff to check in on youth and see how they are coping. He 
elaborated further stating that it was important to “wander the halls or if I see them walk 
through student services here, or to remember, ‘wow, I haven’t seen this kid in a few weeks, 
usually they check in once a week.’ It’s incumbent upon me to identify and to take that first 
step” (Participant S1). Another participant added that schools can create unsafe spaces for 
youth and should be addressed to remove vulnerabilities and develop critical thinking skills to 
affect their actions within the course of their life (Participant R2).  
The Role of the Family 
 With the family component of de-radicalization, there were conflicting views on the 
extent that families could help youth. Participant R6 conducted a workshop with families 
about dealing with parent separation in developmental stages of adolescence, yet it was 
important for parents to maintain a supportive place for youth. When children did not have 
access to open communication with parents, they could turn to media and the internet for 
guidance and belonging instead (Participant S4). Participant A5 believed that the family was 
an important actor in de-radicalization, to keep a youth grounded in their beliefs and maintain 
open dialogue to discuss issues that youth may seek guidance on.   
The Role of the Community 
 Community initiatives were discussed with participants and yielded results on 
favourable and sometimes damaging effects of different approaches to de-radicalization. In 












approach in addressing radicalization in the community. Instead, program managers should go 
into listening mode and ask communities about the issues they are facing to discuss sensitive 
issues of radicalization (Participant A4). Communities also had responsibilities in providing 
youth with opportunities: “it’s so important to have a variety of positive opportunity in both 
community and school. When those things don’t exist, young people will fill their time” 
(Participant S3).  
The Role of the Government 
 Participants suggested that the role of the Canadian government in de-radicalization 
was to design community-based initiatives. This included separating programs from 
enforcement of de-radicalization and “keep it categorically clear that these programs don’t 
have an investigative element” (L. Dawson, personal communication, August 15, 2016). 
Participant S3 believed the government needed to seek continuous feedback from 
stakeholders to ensure that approaches were benefiting the community at large. It was also 
suggested that youth be made part of this review process in regards to asking if programs 
align with their needs and engaging in participatory styles of work (Participant A3).  
Collaboration between Stakeholders  
 Effectiveness of de-radicalization was correlated to the level of stakeholder 
engagement. One participant asserted that de-radicalization was a long process that required a 
collective effort from community and law enforcement (Participant A2). Other participants 
believed coordination with community-based organizations was best to de-radicalize youth: 
“we need to make sure working with all these organizations that nobody is falling through the 
cracks” (Participant R1). Another participant provided detailed information sessions through 
his mosque to raise awareness and give stakeholders a contextual background of 
marginalization of Muslims within the community: 
I got the RCMP, emergency services, [OMITTED] police in for a presentation and in 












your time. So I gave them what I called sensitivity training about what Islam is and 
what you need to know about the Muslim community. (Participant R2) 
Summary 
 Participants noted the possible reasons why youth radicalize and how de-radicalization 
is best informed by these causes. Findings pointed to areas that could be developed by the 
Canadian government including the role of vital institutions within Canada including religion, 
family, school, and the government. As a theme in the primary data, effective practices for 
Canadian de-radicalization included close collaboration between stakeholders. The approach 
could not simply be a community-based initiative, but had to involve law enforcement and 
government as a backing that could enforce or foil violent extremist plots. The other 
implication was that Canada needed to incorporate an informal approach that strengthened 
resiliency in communities and provide a space for youth to voice frustrations about 
contentious issues. In return, this type of discussion can inform and reinforce a positive 




The findings demonstrated key themes in the concepts of de-radicalization and 
radicalization. Primary data from participants and the literature review pointed lack of 
consultations within communities and an absence of building a resilient identity. As a result, 
cases of extremism could worsen if root causes are not addressed. This section discusses the 
importance of trust within communities, Canada’s formal and informal approach to de-
radicalization, identity issues within de-radicalization, and an analysis on the practices of the 
UK. Through the initial findings, formal de-radicalization programs are not necessarily better 













Trust within Communities: Safe Spaces, Belonging, and Identity  
 In review of the UK’s Channel program, it became evident that the Muslim 
community, advocates, and educators had concerns about the program leading to further 
radicalization rather than de-radicalization. Participants believed that those tasked with 
creating de-radicalization programs had to listen to issues that harmed the community. 
Otherwise, imposing perceived best practices could be risky and an uninformed method of de-
radicalization. Findings from participants also indicated that in the formative years of identity, 
children needed a space for belonging, which was created through engagement. If these 
spaces are withheld, children may hide their views and seek out online resources to validate 
their beliefs and ideas. Youth may become further entrenched in radical views by forming an 
opinion based on uninformed social media platforms and messages on extremist pages.  
 Participant S3 reinforced this idea that youth will seek out sources that reinforce their 
existing perceptions instead of challenging their beliefs. This one-dimensional thinking could 
provide a justification for a violent act because of the cognitive bias inherent in individuals. 
Participant S3 asserted as the young mind develops, they have an increased understanding of 
grey things in the world, and youth are “way more black and white with the information that 
they have” (Participant S3). This idea of youth’s dichotic thinking coupled with Social 
Identity Theory would suggest that if youth are not provided the space to belong and discuss 
these “grey issues,” youth would try to find resources online that may only present one 
narrative of that issue. If youth are not given this opportunity to address different beliefs in the 
school or community, they may lose that sense of “being at one with a certain group, being 
like others in the group, and seeing things from the group’s perspective” (Stets & Burke, 
2000, p. 226). As participants noted, this could result in an “other” identity that can then 
become detached from mainstream society and lead to radicalization. The youth would then 
seek out another group online that may hold these values and beliefs and continue the 
radicalization process.  
 Going back to the UK’s approach, the model appears to push youth from a safe space. 












this institution was responsible for funding these initiatives. A common theme was putting the 
community as the face of de-radicalization to establish trust, a sense of inclusion, and 
belonging. More importantly, this sends a message that the radicalized individual is still a 
member of the community. By simply referring to radicalized individuals as the ‘other’ in 
society, “we tend to lose sight of the fact that we are dealing with potentially critical citizens 
who could help shape our democracy” (Van San, Sieckelinck, & de Winter, 2014, p. 277). 
The community-based approach can lead to different outcomes and can reconcile public 
perception with the intention of the program.   
Canada’s Formal and Informal Approach to Youth De-Radicalization  
 Canada falls behind other Western states in formal de-radicalization programs; 
however, this may not be negative. According to L. Dawson, research is only beginning to 
understand what it means to be radicalized: “How do you make a de-radicalization system 
when you don’t know what the process of radicalization is. What constitutes success in these 
programs? These things have to be debated” (personal communication, August 15, 2016). 
Despite this, Canada may be successful in fighting radicalization because of its cautious 
approach in starting a de-radicalization program. The ideas of engagement, safe space, open 
dialogue, investment in mental health, and education were all cited by participants as having a 
positive effect on de-radicalization. These themes contribute to a successful integration in 
Canada, creating a sense of belonging and identity. For Canada specifically, L. Dawson 
suggested that policymakers exercise caution in making a formal approach, as jumping in 
with a program without having supportive research would create potentially harmful programs 
(personal communication, August 15, 2016). When asked about the shape of the program that 
Canada should have, L. Dawson emphasised that it should be community-based. This 
supports the views of primary participants that argued programs should be balanced and that 
affected stakeholders are included.  
 Education on critical thinking was also a commonality among research participants. 
This may expose youth to alternative viewpoints, so they could resist propaganda attempts by 












radicalization, due to its proximity to youth and appears to be overlooked as an effective de-
radicalization tool. This can demonstrate how the community can become the representative 
of de-radicalization and provide those outlets for youth to discuss contentious issues that may 
cause frustration or anger. It is also interesting to note that none of the 19 research participants 
suggested or mentioned the need for a de-radicalization program in Canada. Instead, 
participants focused on informal approaches and structures to de-radicalize. 
Identity Crisis and the Alternative  
 As discussed with Social Identity Theory, youth seek ways to belong through group 
interaction, allowing them to relate to society. This suggests confronting radicalized youth by 
devaluing their beliefs has little chance of reversing the process of radicalization, as youth 
may further embrace their beliefs to protect their group identity. Therefore, offering 
alternatives to a youth’s existing extremist identity remains vital in de-radicalization. Youth 
that continue to delve in these online extremist narratives were noted to exhibit isolationist 
behaviour (Participant R1). Simply taking away the online element is counterproductive as 
that identity or relation to an extremist group needs to be disrupted to be de-radicalized. This 
phenomenon is exemplified in the recent case of Aaron Driver, a 24-year-old ISIS supporter 
from Ontario that was shot by the RCMP after detonating an explosive device in a taxi. Driver 
was arrested in June 2015 for his online activities and was later released on peace bond. After 
the release, there were no alternatives offered to Driver to replace his extremist outlook. 
Professor Alexandra Bain interviewed Driver about his peace bond and noted that without 
replacing Driver’s virtual network with a real one, there was no means of de-radicalizing 
(Shephard, 2016). Professor Bain continued stating that disengagement had to occur before 
de-radicalization could start: 
We have to disengage from notions of violence first. Trying to talk them out of this. I 
think it can never be one person . . . it has to be a social network that deals with these 
young people. It has to be more powerful than the baqiyah family [an online ISIS 
community]. That becomes everything to them. We have to offer them something 












This example demonstrated how Driver felt a lack of belonging in his community, feeling that 
his views would be rejected and stigmatized. However, he did later find belonging online. To 
disengage Driver from his extremist views, he needed an alternative identity, coming in the 
form of openness to debate and listening to his radical views. Once this feeling is established, 
a positive identity can be formed through community-based initiative.      
Criticisms and Good Practices of the UK Prevent Program 
 The UK created an us versus them mentality by requiring mandatory reporting of 
potential radicalized individuals. Unfortunately, the them can be easily manipulated when 
made to feel he or she is not part of the group and in this case, the British identity. While the 
Prevent program did establish an assessment framework using studies of former convicted 
terrorists to determine radicalization factors, they did not consider the psychological lifespan 
or development of different ages. In addition to these issues, frontline workers and teachers 
report any suspected individuals and referred them to Channel, creating a fearful environment. 
This fear fuels extremist propaganda. Instead, the approach requires awareness to counter it, 
promote belonging, unity, and a safe space.  
 Through practices from the UK, good practices can be adapted for use within the 
Canadian model of de-radicalization. While UK’s program was centred on a referral system 
from those dealing with youth directly, they are not trained to address issues surrounding 
radicalization and de-radicalization. This is exemplified in the nearly 4,000 referrals in one 
year of the program. In trying to address radicalization, the UK seemed to seek out one 
minority group to reduce domestic terrorism and lower the recruitment levels of ISIS. 
However, in doing so, the UK created an us vs. them mentality, thereby isolating and targeting 
individuals who may become distrustful of their community by participating in the referral 
process. This could diminish the openness to discuss issues that cause radicalization and 
further reinforce the idea that the UK government is targeting one religion and one group of 
people. This type of approach appears to “otherize” the individual and serve to distance him 
or her from social cohesion and values that encompass British identity. The Canadian 












de-radicalization process and should include those community members within a national 
strategy.  
 The UK government focused on finding potential radicals, and the cost was destroying 
the trust relationship between communities, agencies, and public. As previously discussed, the 
UK made it mandatory for schools to report and refer students to the program by law. This 
caused significant suspicion and fear from within institutions that are supposed to facilitate a 
safe space for discussion of ideas. The Channel program disregarded the possibility that 
schools can be a platform to discuss ideas and promote positive debate as a learning process. 
This also leads to the importance of de-radicalization initiatives originating from the 
community. The UK has adopted a platform that is often perceived as silencing dissent 
against the British government, where parents seek legal advice because the program causes 
“fear and confusion among the Muslim community” (Whitton, 2015). An effective Canadian 
approach includes proactive approaches and a close communication with stakeholders instead 
of an adversarial relationship, and focusing on multiple areas of community engagement 
instead of only focusing on Islam or religion as a root cause of radicalization. Through this 
analysis, the faults of the Channel program serve as lessons to a Canadian framework. 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
To eliminate possible chances of youth radicalization leading to violence, Canada 
should consider proactive investment on a larger scale to youth well-being. This could prevent 
vulnerable youth joining violent extremist groups, and also prevent them from involvement in 
gangs and criminal activities. The UK focused on prevention by forcing untrained frontline 
workers to report possible cases of radicalization, causing division, suspicion, and fear. 
Canada can incorporate lessons from the successes and failures in these approaches by 
building trustful relationships and networks between the public and those providing the 












including communities into de-radicalization and discuss community problems with these 
stakeholders. Otherwise, they may feel targeted and marginalized in their society.  
Recommendations 
Based on findings from the literature review, primary participant data analysis, and the 
analysis of the UK and Canadian approaches, this study provides a set of recommendations. 
These recommendations are aimed at policymakers in Canada and frontline staff working 
with youth, especially at schools. The recommendations are divided into three categories: 1) 
policy makers, 2) schools, and 3) religious institutions.  
Recommendations for Policymakers 
1. Increase funding in the youth initiatives sector, especially within schools. While 
education is a provincial responsibility, youth well-being is an investment for Canada 
on a global scale. Therefore, the federal government should establish a funding 
program where school districts, neighbourhood houses, community centres, and youth 
centres across Canada can apply directly. This fund should be used strictly in 
developing social and extracurricular activities that occur during spring and summer 
break. These programs can include recreational or outdoor activities, youth 
employment programs, and training in vocational programs. As supported by the 
literature and participants, engagement remains one of the key factors in de-
radicalization and helps in forming an identity within the Canadian culture that is 
separate from the us vs. them categorization.  
2. While Canada is doing relatively well with integration practices and policies as an 
indirect de-radicalization effort, it remains paramount for the government to distance 
itself from any current and future de-radicalization programs and initiatives to 
maintain trust between the public and service providers. As the funder, the 
government should also maintain transparency and openness about what the program 












Collaboration with law enforcement groups is necessary in these programs and should 
proactively strive to include community stakeholders in these discussions.  
3. Collaboration between police, security agencies, and moderate religious leaders is 
necessary. Most of the interviewed religious leaders acknowledged that they have the 
responsibility to report any suspicious activity or imminent danger, but police and 
security agencies in Canada should also notify a trusted person from the religious 
group if they become aware of an at-risk youth. The expectation is that moderate 
religious leaders can engage in a dialogue with the at-risk youth, provide religious 
guidance, correct misperceptions of religious teachings and text, or simply provide a 
safe space for the youth to express his or her worldviews. This type of engagement can 
form a trust relationship, where religious leaders can play a major role in deescalating 
the process of radicalization.  
4. Religious leaders play a major role in de-radicalization for their perceived legitimacy 
by youth and their respected position within their community. The government should 
provide free and formal counselling training to religious leaders that are willing or 
interested in working with at-risk youth. This will enhance the professional ability of 
religious leaders based on theoretical and practical knowledge. This form of training 
should be given to religious leaders representing places of worship, in the form of 
scholarships to educational institutions that provide a professional counselling 
program. These programs should be offered in a flexible model to allow religious 
leaders to continue their community and religious commitments. 
5. Investment in youth mental health needs to occur at the school level. Currently, school 
counsellors have a large caseload. For example, one school counsellor participant 
stated: “we have 400 kids on our caseload, and we are basically more triage, like if 
there's a problem, we refer out” (Participant S2). As identified by two participants, 
unless it is suicide attempt or suicidal ideation, that wait list to see a mental health 
professional can be stretched to a six-month waiting period. Within that waiting time, 












translate this into violent action. Provincial governments should invest in mental 
health and youth well-being through hiring more professionals to reduce the waiting 
time for young people. This goal would include the following: wait times of less than 
48 hours to see a professional; less than 24 hours for a telephone screening or intake to 
provide advice; based on the telephone screening, immediate evaluation to ascertain if 
the youth requires professional help. With schools’ busy dynamic and focus, school 
staff and counsellors cannot determine the risk factor in most cases, especially with 
schools being underfunded in the mental health sector.  
6. Policymakers need to adopt a bottom-up approach in designing de-radicalization 
approaches by including youth in the process of discussion, planning, and decision-
making. It remains ineffective to develop a policy for a generation or a group of 
people where policymakers cannot relate to their challenges, worldviews, problems, 
and needs. These issues need to be addressed directly from youth through the planning 
stages, and not only through focus groups or other means. This will enhance inclusion, 
belonging, and participation in society among youth. When it comes to specific 
policies in developing de-radicalization programs or approaches, inclusion of former 
radicalized youth to participate in the discussion at policymaking level should occur. 
Hearing these unique perspectives directly cannot be matched to the interpretation of 
adults around the policymaking table. 
Recommendations for Schools 
1. This section of recommendation can be applied on the school, district, or provincial 
level. Schools, especially middle and secondary schools need to allow time for open 
dialogue. Youth need to express their worldviews, perceived injustices, social and 
political concerns. While schools are busy teaching principles of math, biology, and 
other technical subjects, open learning is forgotten where youth can speak on topics 
that are absent in the curriculum. Four school counsellor participants agreed that youth 
need to communicate their thoughts on world events, and there is a little time to do 












have the opportunity to critically discuss current issues in a safe and protective 
environment. Otherwise, youth tend to find an alternative through online platforms. A 
class of 40 minutes every second day dedicated to a discussion of worldviews will not 
only channel youth anger but will also enhance learning that is not offered in 
textbooks. While this specific recommendation is more for ministries of education, 
school districts can add this component in a form of an elective block. Critical 
thinking would be a major outcome of learning in this elective.  
2. School districts need to invest more in community secondary schools. This approach 
to education provides that schools are open in summer hours, in the evening, and after 
school to facilitate community activities. Community schools offer an opportunity for 
families to be part of the school community, and simultaneously provides students 
with a sense of identity, whether through contribution to the extracurricular activities, 
school clubs, and community planning events with parents and staff (Burnaby School 
District, 2016). 
Recommendations for Religious Leaders 
 At-risk youth in the process of radicalization may rely on advice from well-respected 
religious leaders. If youth are turned away or discouraged from questioning beliefs, they may 
find an alternative source that validates their viewpoint. Religious leaders are encouraged to 
follow these recommendations: 
1. Have the flexibility to discuss any topic, thought or idea in a non-judgmental manner, 
including those that oppose religious principles to assist youth in maintaining an open 
and moderate view of religion.   
2. Religious leaders should strive to become informed on world issues, politics, and even 
on social media to relate to youth.This will help religious leaders to better understand 
the difficulties youth are facing. Assistance does not need to entail religious advice or 













3. Religious leaders have a role to play in reaching out to the media. As world events 
unfold, and with recent terrorist attacks in Europe, there is a great frustration among 
Muslim youth on how the media is portraying these incidents as a “Muslim-only” 
problem. It is not only the media’s responsibility to report accurately, it is also the 
responsibility of the community to reach out to the media. By religious institutions 
maintaining an open dialogue with the media, they can offer their account of events, 
correct a misinformed report, and even give local youth a chance to present their 
voice.  
4. Religious leaders should emphasize that all interpretations of religion have evolved 
with changing attitudes and beliefs. This would help prevent youth from falling victim 
to misinterpreting passages and question interpretations when exposed to recruitment 
propaganda like ISIS.  
Conclusion 
 Globalized communication has connected youth in different ways, but the role of 
media has created dichotic understandings of a very complex world. Practices in the UK have 
shown that community-based initiatives are required to create a safe and inclusive platform 
for youth to share their views and maintain a positive Canadian identity. Adding a critical 
thinking component to Canadian schools can give youth a foundation to question and be 
curious about their surroundings. The Canadian model of de-radicalization is not a simple 
program. It needs to occur in prevention. When youth have passed the point and have become 
radicalized, they are creating a place for them to feel included, thereby creating an identity 
with a group that provides this belonging. Simply taking away online materials or placing 
youth on restrictive conditions does not ensure a moderate view. This is why an alternative 
group identity is needed to replace a harmful group that claims it is inclusive of the youth’s 
views. While identity and belonging were a main issue from research participants, it was 
lacking as a key indicator in the literature, as was a concise and unified definition of de-
radicalization. Youth need an advocate and a community to surround them when they are 












family, the government, and the community to protect youth and promote youth well-being in 
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